The disruption of short-term memory by to-be-ignored auditory sequences (the changing-state effect) has often been characterized as attentional capture by deviant events (deviation effect). However, the present study demonstrates that changing-state and deviation effects are functionally distinct forms of auditory distraction: The disruption of visual-verbal serial recall by changing-state speech was independent of the effect of a single deviant voice embedded within the speech (Experiment 1); a voice-deviation effect, but not a changing-state effect, was found on a missing-item task (Experiment 2); and a deviant voice repetition within the context of an alternating-voice irrelevant speech sequence disrupted serial recall (Experiment 3). The authors conclude that the changing-state effect is the result of a conflict between 2 seriation processes being applied concurrently to relevant and irrelevant material, whereas the deviation effect reflects a more general attention-capture process.
A fundamental and indispensable characteristic of an adaptive cognitive system is its capacity to strike an appropriate (if delicate) balance between two countervailing forces: The need to select a subset of the current melange of available information to form the basis of current goal-driven behavior (selectivity) must somehow be balanced against the advantage conferred by remaining open to the influence of stimuli that may be irrelevant to that goal ( permeability; e.g., Allport, 1989; Hughes & Jones, 2003a; Neumann, 1987) . However, the benefits of permeability come with the price of distractibility, whereby irrelevant stimuli can sometimes compromise the efficacy of goal-driven behavior (e.g., Hughes & Jones, 2003a) . Of particular interest in the present article is the phenomenon of auditory distraction, the disruption of goal-driven behavior by the mere presence of task-irrelevant sound (for reviews, see Eimer, Nattkemper, Schröger, & Prinz, 1996; Hughes & Jones, 2001) .
Within the cognitive-behavioral tradition, the main strand of research on auditory distraction has been that concerned with how short-term serial memory is disrupted markedly by to-be-ignored sound so long as that sound is changing acoustically (the changing-state effect; e.g., Jones & Macken, 1993) . A quite separate strand of research on auditory distraction-embedded more within the psychophysiological tradition-is that concerned with the physiological and behavioral distraction effects of an auditory event that deviates in some way from the recent auditory past (the deviation effect; e.g., Cowan, 1995; Näätänen, Tervianiemi, Sussman, Paavilainen, & Winkler, 2001; Schröger, 1997) . In the present article, we sought to adjudicate between two theoretical accounts of how these two instances of auditory distraction are related. The unitary account supposes that both the deviation effect and the changing-state effect are explicable by recourse to the same explanatory construct, namely exogenous attentional orienting or attentional capture (Cowan, 1995; Elliott, 2002 ; see also Rinne, Särkkä, Degerman, Schröger, & Alho, 2006) . The alternative, duplex-mechanism account holds that although the deviation effect may be attributed to attentional capture, the changing-state effect is better explained by recourse to interference-by-process. In this view, changing-state stimuli do not capture attention; rather, the preattentive and obligatory processing of the order of the changing stimuli conflicts with the deliberate serial rehearsal of the to-be-remembered stimuli (e.g., Jones, Beaman, & Macken, 1996) . We begin by describing in more detail the two key empirical phenomena of interest.
Auditory Distraction From Changing-State and Deviant Events
The mere presence of a sound sequence substantially disrupts short-term serial recall even when the memory task is presented in the visual modality and despite the fact participants are explicitly told to ignore the sound (the irrelevant sound effect; e.g., Beaman & Jones, 1997; Colle & Welsh, 1976; Ellermeier & Zimmer, 1997; Hughes & Jones, 2003b , 2005 Jones & Macken, 1993 , 1995 LeCompte, 1994; Salamé & Baddeley, 1982) . Usually, this has been demonstrated in a paradigm in which about 6 -9 letters or digits are presented sequentially on a screen at the rate of about one per second and which are to be recalled in strict serial order. The presence of to-be-ignored sound-regardless of whether it accompanies the presentation of the to-be-remembered items or a retention interval interpolated between the last item and a recall cue-disrupts serial recall appreciably (see Ellermeier & Zimmer, 1997 , for a discussion of effect-size and stability statistics). The empirical signature of this disruption of serial recall is the changing-state effect: For marked and reliable disruption there must be acoustic change between each successive, segmentable element within the sound. Thus, a speech sequence such as G K F B. . . or a succession of tones varying in frequency (Jones & Macken, 1993) produces marked disruption, whereas a repeated (or steady-state) speech token (e.g., G G G G. . .) or tone exerts little if any effect (e.g., Campbell, Beaman, & Berry, 2002; Jones & Macken, 1993; Jones, Madden, & Miles, 1992; Tremblay & Jones, 1998) .
Of key interest in the present article is the nature of the relationship between the changing-state effect and what may be termed the deviation effect. This refers to the fact that across a wide range of focal tasks, an infrequent and usually unexpected change or deviation in auditory stimulation following a repetitive or continuous auditory input-which may be represented abstractly as AAAAAB-tends to trigger an attentional capture mechanism, an involuntary redirecting or orienting of the attentional focus toward the deviant event (for reviews, see Eimer et al., 1996; Näätänen et al., 2001) . One, historically primary, strand of literature examining deviation effects is that based on the concept of an orienting response (OR; Cowan, 1988 Cowan, , 1995 Pavlov, 1927; Sokolov, 1963; Voronin & Sokolov, 1960) . The OR refers to a panoply of physiological (e.g., slowing of the heart rate, increase in the electrodermal response), psychological (involuntary redirection of attention) and motoric (e.g., eye and head movements) effects evoked by a stimulus that is discrepant in some way from the recent past (i.e., a novel stimulus). According to OR theory, the repetition or continuation of a stimulus leads to the habituation of the OR as the result of the progressive fabrication of a mental representation-called a neuronal or neural model-of that stimulus (Cowan, 1995; Sokolov, 1963) . Thus, neural model formation serves as a highly adaptive change-or novelty-detection system: If, and only if, a stimulus fails to match an already-formed neural model, the stimulus is registered as novel and thereby endowed with the power to elicit an orienting response 1 (Elliott & Cowan, 2001; Gati & Ben-Shakhar, 1990; Reisberg, Baron, & Kemler, 1980; Waters, McDonald, & Koresko, 1977) .
Another substrand of psychophysiological research-that based on event-related potentials (ERPs)-has been instrumental in elucidating details of the effects of deviant auditory stimuli (e.g., Cowan, Winkler, Teder, & Näätänen, 1993; Loveless, 1983; Nää-tänen, 1990 Nää-tänen, , 1992 Schröger, 1997) . Following a repeated auditory stimulus (the standard), a stimulus that deviates from that standard in terms of some acoustic (e.g., frequency, intensity) or temporal attribute (e.g., stimulus duration, interstimulus interval [ISI] ) is associated with the elicitation of specific ERP components (the mismatch negativity [MMN] and P3a being the most commonly implicated; others have argued more recently that an enhancement of the N1 component may also be involved; e.g., Rinne et al., 2006) . Consistent with the notion that these ERP waves are associated with attentional capture, other research has shown that ERP waves often coincide with behavioral impairments such as delays in categorizing visual targets (e.g., Escera, Alho, Winkler, & Näätänen, 1998) or in responding to auditory targets presented to an attended ear, in the presence of deviants embedded in sequences presented to the unattended ear (e.g., Näätänen, Paavilainen, Tiitinen, Jiang, & Alho, 1993) .
Unitary and Duplex-Mechanism Accounts of the Changing-State and Deviation Effects
Two theoretical positions can be distinguished with regard to the relationship between the changing-state effect in the context of short-term serial recall (e.g., Jones et al., 1992) and attentional capture by deviant auditory events (e.g., Näätänen et al., 2001) . One position-the unitary account-holds that the changing-state effect and the deviation effect are essentially one and the same phenomenon (Cowan, 1995; Elliott, 2002 ; see also Lange, 2005; Rinne et al., 2006) . On this account, changing-state auditory stimuli are construed as a succession of deviants that repetitively capture attention from, and hence disrupt, the focal serial recall task. In contrast, steady-state stimuli lead to the rapid habituation of the attentional capture mechanism, thus leaving serial recall performance relatively unscathed. For example, in discussing the changing-state effect, Cowan (1995) argued that "a change in the physical state is . . . the likely precondition for the orienting of attention" (p. 146), and similarly, Elliott (2002) contended that "changes in sounds produce discrepancies from the existing mental model of the sounds, interfering [with serial recall] more than sounds without changes" (p. 480). More recently, Rinne et al. (2006) have also speculated that the changing-state effect may be related to "involuntary attention switching so that attention controlled processing of task-relevant information is interrupted for an instant" (p. 142).
Against this unitary account is pitted the duplex-mechanism account (Hughes, Vachon, & Jones, 2005) . According to this view, the deviation effect may be ascribed to attentional capture, but the changing-state effect is better construed as the result of 1 We should note that we are concerned in this article only with aspecific attentional capture in which there is nothing about the stimulus per se that endows it with attention-capturing power; its power is entirely dependent on the fact that it is discrepant from the context provided by earlier stimuli. This may be contrasted with specific attentional capture, which occurs when the power of the stimulus to capture attention derives from some special significance that the stimulus itself has for the individual. Examples of such significant stimuli might be one's own name (Moray, 1959) or the particular cry of one's own child (for further discussion, see Eimer et al., 1996) . interference-by-process (Jones & Macken, 1993; Jones & Tremblay, 2000; Macken, Tremblay, Houghton, Nicholls, & Jones, 2003) . On the basis of Bregman's (1990) auditory scene analysis framework, this explanation of the changing-state effect supposes that the preattentive detection of acoustic mismatches between successive events in the auditory sequence produces information pertaining to the order of those events as a by-product of primitive auditory perceptual organization processes. This obligatory and involuntary processing of order in the sound is thought to come into conflict with the similar, but this time deliberate, ordering (or seriation) process involved in the serial rehearsal of the to-beremembered items. More specifically, the disruption may reflect the cost of having to select for action (possibly through the use of an inhibitory mechanism; see Hughes & Jones, 2003b ) one amongst two streams of information, both of which represent plausible candidates for the deliberate skill of planning a gestural (e.g., articulatory) sequence . In this view, therefore, the changes in the sound do not capture attention from the primary task; rather, they yield order cues that compete for the specific type of processing demanded by the focal task.
On the face of it, the unitary account is the more attractive given its obvious parsimony. However, the results of the only study to date that has covaried changing-state stimuli and deviants within the same experimental paradigm produced results that are problematic for this account . In that study, a temporal deviation-one speech token delayed relative to the regular rhythm of its predecessors-was introduced into either a steady-or changing-state irrelevant speech sequence presented during a visual-verbal serial recall task. In line with the attentional capture approach, the temporal deviation, which would constitute a clear discrepancy from a neural model embodying the ISI between successive speech items (see Ford & Hillyard, 1981) , disrupted serial recall appreciably. However, critically, this temporal deviation effect and the changing-state effect were additive, suggesting that although the deviation effect could be ascribed to the action of an attentional capture mechanism, the changing-state effect could not be similarly ascribed. To elaborate: If changingstate stimuli (e.g., 6 8 1 3 7 2 5 4) repetitively capture attention by virtue of the fact that each is discrepant from a neural model of its predecessor(s), it follows that introducing a further attentioncapturing event (the temporal deviant) into that sequence (i.e., 6 8 1 3 7__25 4) should have proportionately less effect on recall than when it occurs within a sequence of repeated tokens that are not already diverting attention from the focal task (e.g., 6 6 6 6 6__66 6). This was not the case: The magnitude of the deviation effect was not modulated by sequence context, suggesting that the two effects are functionally independent. The central purpose of the present study was to build on the results of and adjudicate more emphatically than hitherto between the unitary and duplex-mechanism accounts of auditory distraction.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 had two goals. First, we sought to establish whether a single change in voice within an irrelevant speech sequence captures attention and disrupts serial recall, as has been shown for a temporal deviation . This question commands interest in its own right insofar as the available evidence with regard to whether changes of voice are endowed with attention-capturing power remains inconclusive. For example, the classic finding that one of the few changes participants typically notice within the unattended ear in the selective shadowing paradigm is a change in the speaker's voice is clearly consistent with the view that voice changes can capture attention. However, it has been pointed out that the early selective listening studies (for an overview, see Driver, 2001) , in their reliance on participants' retrospective explicit reports about the information presented to the unattended ear, failed to minimize sufficiently the chances of participants voluntarily attending to the unattended channel (e.g., Jones, 1999) . The irrelevant sound paradigm does not suffer from this shortcoming given that participants are never asked anything about the sound (for further detailed discussion of the assumption that the sound remains unattended in the irrelevant sound paradigm, see Macken et al., 2003) . Moreover, although many ERP studies have demonstrated an MMN to sound frequency deviations (for a review, see Näätänen et al., 2001 ), only one study has shown that a voice-change in particular evokes the MMN while participants were engaged in an unrelated videowatching task (Titova & Näätänen, 2001 ). However, whether this neural response to voice change was accompanied by the psychological phenomenon of attentional capture was not the purpose of (and was not assessed in) that study. Finally, using a cross-modal Stroop paradigm, Elliott and Cowan (2001) pre-exposed participants to one of several stimulus types (tone, neutral word, color word) which could then be encountered as distractors in a subsequent test of color-patch naming. They found that a change in the categorical status of the distractor type between pre-exposure and test (e.g., pre-exposed to tones and encountering neutral word distractors or pre-exposed to neutral words and encountering color-word distractors), impaired color-patch naming compared with consistency between pre-exposure stimuli and test distractor type, suggesting that such changes capture attention. However, changing only the voice conveying, for example, neutral words at pre-exposure and neutral words as distractors failed to exert a similar attentional capture effect.
2
The primary purpose of establishing a voice deviation effect in the context of serial recall, however, was to use it as a device to adjudicate between the unitary and duplex-mechanism accounts of changing-state and deviation effects. Although we have established a temporal deviation in this context , a voice-deviation effect confers some further methodological advantages. For example, in Experiment 3 we go on to examine whether the repetition of an event embedded within an otherwise changing sequence of events produces a deviation effect within the current paradigm, a question that would be difficult to address using a temporal deviation. Although we postpone providing a more detailed rationale for Experiment 3, we contend that establishing a deviant repetition effect would shed light on the reason why the changing-state effect is not related to attentional capture.
A second goal of Experiment 1 was to examine whether or not any voice-change effect observed is additive to the changing-state effect, as was found to be the case with a temporal deviation effect . To recapitulate: If a deviant-on this occasion, a single change of voice-embedded within an irrelevant speech sequence has as much impact in the context of changing-state tokens as it does in the context of a steady-state token, it would suggest that deviation and changing-state effects are mediated by different mechanisms. An interaction between the two factors by which the deviation effect is larger in the context of a steady-state sequence compared with a changing-state sequence would support the unitary mechanism account of auditory distraction.
Method Participants
Thirty-eight undergraduate students at Cardiff University, United Kingdom, took part in return for course credits. All participants reported normal hearing and normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus and Materials
The to-be-remembered visually presented sequences were of eight items in length and were taken without replacement from the digit set 1-9 and arranged in a quasi-random order, with the constraint that successive digits were not adjacent integers. Each item was 2.5 cm in height and presented sequentially in Times New Roman font at the center of the screen of a Macintosh Performa using the Psyscope 1.2.2 software (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993) . Each digit was presented for 350 ms and the ISI (offset to onset) was 400 ms.
For the irrelevant auditory sequences, two sets of the spoken letters A B C G J K L M Q S were recorded, once in a female voice and once in a male voice. Within each set, each item was spoken at an approximately even pitch and edited using SoundForge software so that each lasted 250 ms. Care was also taken to ensure that all auditory stimuli, regardless of voice gender, were presented at approximately 65dB(A). Using these stimuli, we generated four types of irrelevant sequence:
1. Steady-state (SS) . In a sequence of this type, one of the female-spoken letters-chosen randomly from the set of ten for each trial-was repeated ten times with an ISI of 350 ms. The onset of the first letter-sound occurred 125 ms before the onset of the first visual digit, and the offset of the final letter-sound preceded the offset of the final visual digit by 75 ms.
Changing-state (CS).
A sequence of this type had the same timing characteristics as an SS sequence but the sequence was composed of all ten female-spoken letters presented in a different random order for each trial.
SS ϩ deviant (SS ϩ d).
This type of sequence was identical to the SS sequence-type except that the sixth letter, which occurred 125 ms before the onset of the fifth to-be-remembered digit, was conveyed in a male voice.
CS ϩ deviant (CS ϩ d).
This type of sequence was identical to the CS sequence type except that the sixth letter was conveyed in a male voice.
Design
The design comprised three repeated-measures factors: state (SS or CS), deviation, (whether or not the sequence contained a deviation in voice), and serial position (eight levels; i.e., the position of an item in the to-be-remembered list). There were 90 trials in all divided into two blocks: The SS block consisted of 39 no deviant trials (i.e., simply SS) and 6 with deviant trials (i.e., SS ϩ d), and the CS block consisted of 39 CS trials and 6 CS ϩ d trials. In each block, the with deviant trials were trials 5, 8, 18, 27, 35, and 41 . The order of the two blocks was counterbalanced across participants.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a sound-attenuated booth. Each participant read standard instructions that informed them of what the serial recall task involved. They were also told that sound would be presented over the headphones but that it was irrelevant to their task and that they were therefore to ignore it. They were not told about the presence of deviant events within the sound. Participants were informed that the trials would be presented at a preset pace. Fifty ms following the offset of the last visual item, the screen flashed from white to black for 150 ms, which signaled to the participants that they should begin to write out the to-be-remembered list in an answer booklet containing 92 rows of eight blank squares (2 for the practice trials, and 90 for the experimental trials). From the offset of the screen flashing, there were 15 s before the presentation of the first item of the next to-be-remembered list. Thirteen seconds into the 15 s of writing time, a 500-ms tone was presented over the headphones to signal to the participant that the presentation of the first item of the next sequence was imminent. There were two no deviant practice trials before the first block (two SS trials or two CS trials depending on which block participants encountered first). Including an optional 5-min break between blocks, the experiment lasted approximately 40 min.
Results
The raw data were scored according to the strict serial recall criterion: To be recorded as correct, an item had to be recalled in its original presentation position. Figure 1 shows the percentage of items correctly recalled across the eight serial positions in the four irrelevant sound conditions: SS, SS ϩ d, CS, and CS ϩ d. The first result to note is that the changing-state effect was replicated: Recall levels were depressed for changing, compared with steadysteady sequences, regardless of the presence of a voice deviation. Of greater interest, there was a compelling deviation effect: Recall was poorer in the presence of a change in voice, and, critically, this effect appears to be of roughly the same magnitude regardless of whether the deviant was embedded in an SS or CS sequence.
A 
Discussion
The implications of Experiment 1 are clear: The results establish that a single deviant voice within a to-be-ignored sequence of irrelevant speech tokens disrupts visual-verbal serial recall. Consistent with our previous findings using a temporal deviant , it is also clear that the voice-change effect is not localized to the to-be-remembered items presented most closely in time to the deviant (the fourth and fifth items). In fact, there is some indication that recall of the item immediately following the deviant (Serial Position 5) was less affected than recall of other items. Although this apparent resistance to impairment in recall of the to-be-remembered item immediately following the deviant is intriguing, we refrain from speculating about a possible mechanism because the same pattern was not evident either in our previous studies using a temporal deviation nor in Experiment 3 of the present series. Notwithstanding the interaction of deviation and serial position in Experiment 1, that the effect is apparent throughout most of the serial position curve is not surprising if one makes the generally uncontroversial assumption that during presentation of to-be-serially-recalled items, participants are assembling items into a rehearsal cohort. An interruption of this assembly process would therefore be expected to cause any local errors to propagate-both forward and backward-throughout the serial position curve.
The present findings demonstrate that a voice deviation that is irrelevant to a focal task can capture attention. As such, they are consistent with Cherry's (1953) finding that participants tend to notice a change in the voice in the unattended ear in a selective listening task and with the finding that a voice change elicits the MMN (Titova & Näätänen, 2001) . They also call into question the generality of Elliott and Cowan's (2001) suggestion that their failure to observe a voice-change effect in their cross-modal Stroop study can ". . .be explained on the grounds that the voice of the distracting sound is irrelevant to task performance and that the neural model incorporates and uses information about the relevance of stimuli to required responses in the task. . ." (p. 664) and that it is therefore the "potential relevance of the ignored stimuli to the attended task that is most critical" (p. 664; italics in original). However, given that it is difficult to envisage how a single change in voice could be perceived as potentially relevant in the context of a visually presented serial recall task, it appears that response relevance is certainly not necessary for disruption by attentional capture. One possibility is that the voice deviation did capture attention in Elliott and Cowan's study (as the authors suggested) but that their paradigm happens to be one that is not impaired by attentional capture generally unless the deviation could also plausibly mark the onset of a succession of distractors that are response relevant (i.e., color-word distractors).
In addition to the voice-deviation effect itself, the second key aspect of the results is that the magnitude of that effect, as was found with a temporal deviant , was roughly the same regardless of whether it was embedded in a steady-or changing-state sequence. According to the unitary account of auditory distraction in which the changing-state effect is a multiple-deviation effect, changing-state, but not steady-state, stimuli would have already been repetitively capturing attention from the serial recall task. Thus, adding another attentioncapturing event (the voice change) should have been relatively impotent in this context as compared with a steady-state context. This provides the first of three lines of evidence reported in the present article that converge to suggest that the unitary account (Cowan, 1995; Elliott, 2002) is untenable.
The additivity of the changing-state and deviation effects appears to be robust, having now been observed consistently across three experiments (present in Experiment 1 with a voice deviant and in Experiments 1 and 4 in , with a temporal deviant). However, it could be argued that this line of evidence against the unitary account is suggestive but not definitive insofar as it relies ultimately on a null result, that is, the absence of an interaction between deviation and the sequence context. In Experiment 2, therefore, we take a more direct approach to teasing apart the unitary and duplex accounts of changing-state and deviation effects by examining whether a deviation effect can be found in the context of a short-term memory task-the missing item task (Jones & Macken, 1993; Beaman & Jones, 1997) -that has been found to be immune to the changing-state effect.
Experiment 2
An assumption unique to the interference-by-process account of the changing-state effect is that the effect is a joint product of the nature of the sound and the nature of the particular skill deployed in the primary serial recall task (serial rehearsal). That is, not only must the sound yield cues to order but the focal task must also involve a seriation process; in the absence of either component, there is no conflict of similar processes and hence little interference should arise. In support of this key contention, irrelevant sound has consistently been found to be much more disruptive of tasks that rely on or encourage serial rehearsal than tasks in which serial rehearsal is a negligible aspect (e.g., Beaman & Jones, 1997 Boyle & Coltheart, 1996; Burani, Vallar, & Bottini, 1991; Henson, Hartley, Burgess, Hitch, & Flude, 2003; Marsh, Hughes, & Jones, in press; Perham, Banbury, & Jones, 2007; Richardson, 1984; Salamé & Baddeley, 1990) . For example, a changing-state effect, as replicated in Experiment 1, is found if the task is to reproduce the serial order of a sequence taken from the set 1-9. However, if instead the task requires identifying on each trial which item was missing from the set (a task that does not necessitate the retention of serial order; Beaman & Jones, 1997; Murdock, 1993) , the irrelevant sound effect is greatly diminished (Beaman & Jones, 1997) , and, critically, it does not show its empirical signature, the changing-state effect (Jones & Macken, 1993, Experiment 4) .
In contrast, there is no reason to expect deviation effects to be dependent on the specific nature of the focal task. Thus, by covarying changing-versus steady-state and the presence or absence of a deviant voice change in the context of a missing-item task, Experiment 2 provides the first direct test of the hypothesis that the changing-state effect, but not the deviation effect, is dependent on a seriation component in the focal task.
The presentation conditions and design were very similar to those of Experiment 1; the only substantive change pertained to the participant's task. Nine-item lists taken from the 10-item set 0 -9 were presented, but rather than serial recall, the task was to identify the item missing from each list. The same four conditions (SS, SS ϩ d, CS, and CS ϩ d) were again contrasted. On an attentional capture account of the changing-state effect, we should expect both a changing-state effect and a deviation effect that, in turn, should be smaller in the context of changing-state stimuli. The duplex account predicts a deviation effect but not a changingstate effect and, again, the deviation effect should not differ in magnitude according to whether it is embedded within changingor steady-state stimuli.
Method Participants
Twenty-eight Cardiff University undergraduates took part in a repeated-measures design in return for course credits. All participants reported normal hearing and normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus and Materials
The materials were presented using a custom-written Python program running on an RM Pentium PC and were very similar to those of Experiment 1 except for the following minor changes. The primary task list for each trial consisted of 9 items taken from the 10-item set 0 -9, with the item missing from each list being chosen randomly for each trial. The list length was increased by one item, compared with Experiment 1, in light of previous evidence (Beaman and Jones, 1997, Experiment 1) suggesting that using a list length any shorter than this for the missing-item task-at least when using digits-would likely be too easy and lead to a possible ceiling effect. Indeed, even with nine-digit lists, Beaman and Jones (1997) found performance in the missing-item task to still be relatively high. However, in their experiment, the onset-to-onset interval was 1250 ms (item duration, 1000 ms; ISI, 250 ms). In the present experiment, we hoped that adhering to the shorter onsetto-onset intervals used in the present Experiment 1 would further guard against the chances of obtaining a ceiling effect. In fact, we shortened the onset-to-onset interval for this experiment compared with Experiment 1 by 85 ms so that the additional digit could be accommodated without altering the duration and timing of the accompanying irrelevant sound sequences. Specifically, the duration of the digits remained at 350 ms, but the ISI was reduced from 400 to 316.67 ms. The deviant still occurred roughly in the middle of the to-be-remembered list as in Experiment 1, its onset occurring 208.32 ms following the onset of the fifth digit (bearing in mind that the list was one item longer than in Experiment 1).
Design
The design was identical to that of Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was also identical to that of Experiment 1 except for the response phase of each trial: Fifty ms following the offset of the last visual item, the digits 0 -9 appeared horizontally on the screen. Participants had 10 s to click (using a mouse) on the digit they thought was missing from the just-presented list. A 500-ms tone sounded 2 s before the end of this 10-s response phase to signal to the participant that the presentation of the first digit of the next trial was imminent. Including an optional 5-min break between the two blocks, the experiment lasted approximately 30 min. Figure 2 shows the percentage of responses in which the missing item was identified correctly for each of the four irrelevant sound conditions. The pattern is straightforward and confirms both predictions of the duplex account of auditory distraction and it refutes both predictions of the unitary account: There is a clear voicechange effect regardless of sequence context (i.e., SS or CS) but no evidence of a changing-state effect, and the magnitude of the voice-change effect appears to be independent of sequence context. It is also worth noting that having a shorter onset-to-onset interval than used by Beaman and Jones (1997) 
Results

Cross-Experiment Analysis
Given that the designs of Experiments 1 and 2 were identical, we decided to analyze the data from the two experiments combined in a 2 (task; serial recall vs. missing item) ϫ 2 (state) ϫ 2 (deviation) mixed ANOVA (we collapsed the data across serial position for Experiment 1). The pattern of results was entirely in line with, and provides yet stronger statistical support for, the duplex-mechanism account: Although the main effect of state was not significant, F(1, 64) ϭ 1.58, MSE ϭ 178.54, p ϭ .214, Cohen's d ϭ 0.31, the critical interaction between state and task was indeed significant, F(1, 64) ϭ 8.37, MSE ϭ 178.54, p Ͻ .005, Cohen's d ϭ 0.72, reflecting the fact that the changing-state effect was confined to the serial recall task. The main effect of deviation was also significant, F(1, 64) ϭ 14.98, MSE ϭ 126.73, p Ͻ .001, Cohen's d ϭ 0.97, and, importantly, did not vary according to either task (F Ͻ 1, Cohen's d ϭ 0.20) or state (F Ͻ 1, Cohen's d ϭ 0.02), and the 3-way interaction was also not significant (F Ͻ 1, Cohen's d ϭ 0.07). Thus, the voice deviation was as disruptive in the missing-item task as it was in the serial recall task, and in both settings the magnitude of the disruption was roughly the same regardless of sequence context. The only other significant result was a main effect of task, reflecting the fact that performance was poorer generally in the missing item task, F(1, 64) ϭ 13.69, MSE ϭ 1665.88, p Ͻ .001, Cohen's d ϭ 0.93.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 replicate those of Jones and Macken (1993) , which showed that in stark contrast to the case with serial recall, no difference is found in the disruptive power of steady-and changing-state irrelevant stimuli in the context of a missing-item task. The novel aspect of the present results is that the missingitem task is clearly susceptible to a deviation effect. The unitary account has great difficulty in accounting for this result: If changing-state stimuli and deviant events both disrupt performance by the same attentional capture mechanism, there is no reason to expect changing-state but not deviant stimuli to be rendered impotent simply by stripping the focal task of a serial order requirement. For the same reasons as discussed in relation to Experiment 1, the absence of an interaction between deviance and sequence context in this experiment is also problematic for the unitary account.
That a deviation effect was found in the missing-item task is particularly welcome for the interference-by-process account of the changing-state effect. Previous studies had found little or no disruption by irrelevant sound on this task, whereas a marked irrelevant sound effect is consistently found in tasks requiring the retention of serial order (e.g., Beaman & Jones, 1997; Jones & Macken, 1993) . Although such a finding is clearly consistent with the interference-by-process account, a skeptic could object that the missing-item task may, for some reason, simply be very insensitive to disruption of any kind (or at least from the mere presence of task-irrelevant stimuli). Thus, that the missing-item task is susceptible to one type of auditory distraction (the deviation effect) but not another (the changing-state effect) provides more unequivocal evidence than hitherto that a key component of the changing-state effect is that the focal task must involve or encourage a serial rehearsal strategy. In sum, the results of Experiment 2 bolster those of Experiment 1 in suggesting that the changing-state and deviation effects are functionally distinct.
Experiment 3
At this juncture, we take a further conceptual step and address the question of why the changing-state effect does not seem to be related to attentional capture. The general hypothesis to be tested is that the difficulties encountered by the attentional capture account of the changing-state effect derive from its logical commitment to what may be an inadequate view of the neural model assumed to underpin the capture process (see also . Our analysis begins with the observation that the changingstate effect is not dictated by how well each successive stimulus can be predicted given the structure of previous stimuli. Thus A X F B D R L. . . is no more disruptive than A X A X A X. . . ; see also Tremblay & Jones, 1998) . Similarly, A C B C B A. . . is no more disruptive than A B C A B C. . . (Jones et al., 1992) . The precondition for the changing-state effect, then-as far as the sound is concerned-is the presence of change between each successive stimulus (Tremblay & Jones, 1998) . Thus, if the changing-state effect is the result of attentional capture (e.g., Cowan, 1995) , then capture occurs when there is an absence of a match between a stimulus and a neural model of its predecessor or a neural model that represents an aggregation of several preceding stimuli.
A great virtue of the aggregate-based view of the neural model is its relative simplicity: Detecting a difference between a given stimulus and a representation of the previous stimulus (or aggregate of previous stimuli) would only seem to require a simple sensor mechanism, one that registers changes in elementary acoustic attributes (for further discussion, see Eimer et al., 1996) . However, although such a conceptualization was popular in the early literature on the OR (Voronin & Sokolov, 1960 ; for a discussion, see Velden, 1978) , it has long been recognized that this view fails to accommodate a whole host of findings showing that effects typically associated with attentional capture are related to sequential structure or regularities (e.g., Schröger, 1997; Velden, 1978 ; see also Näätänen's, 1990 , reply to Cowan, 1990 . For example, in the literature on the OR, there are cases in which the OR habituates despite changes between successive stimuli (1 2 3 4 5. . .) and dishabituates once a stimulus is encountered that fails to conform to the sequential structure (on the basis of long-term knowledge in this case) evident in the sequence (e.g., 1 2 3 4 5 7. . .; Unger, 1964) . Moreover, ERP studies have found an MMN in response to the repetition of a tone following a succession of alternating tones (i. e., A B A B A B B. . .; Nordby, Roth, & Pfefferbaum, 1988) . These observations suggest, contrary to the aggregate-based account, that a difference between a stimulus and its predecessor(s) is neither sufficient nor necessary for attentional capture (Velden, 1978) . Indeed, in the case of a deviant repetition effect (Nordby et al., 1988) , an MMN occurs precisely because the stimulus fails to differ from its immediate predecessor.
An alternative and more adequate view is that attentional capture is based on an algorithmic neural model, one that describes the rules underlying any structure or pattern in the sequence. Attentional capture occurs when a stimulus violates implicit predictions extrapolated from those rules (e.g., Näätänen, 1990; Velden, 1978) . At first glance, it might seem, contrary to the available evidence mentioned earlier, that this view would predict that the sequence A X F B D R L. . . would be more disruptive than A X A X A X. . .. However, a stimulus that positively violates a prediction is not synonymous with a stimulus that simply was not predicted (or could not be predicted). Thus, in the sequence A X F B D R L. . . (all spoken in the same voice and with a regular ISI) the identity of each letter cannot be predicted from the history of previous stimuli; the identity of each letter is unpredictable. However, none of the stimuli in such a sequence-just as is the case in a steady-state sequence-is a deviant; not one violates a prediction that can be derived from the sequence. Thus, each stimulus conforms to, for example, the predictions that each item will be in the same voice, each item will be a letter, each item will arrive after a gap of x ms, each letter will differ from its predecessor, and so on; hence, none of the stimuli would capture attention. In short, on this algorithmic view of the neural model, the changing-state effect cannot be attributed to repeated attentional capture.
The algorithmic view can readily accommodate the additivity of the changing-state effect and the voice-change effect observed in the present Experiment 1 (and in , with a temporal deviant): Because on this account neither a steady-nor changing-state sequence contains any deviants, the single change of voice, which would indeed violate a prediction and hence qualify as a deviant, would be expected to be as potent in either type of sequence. However, in Experiment 3, we take a more direct approach to testing the unitary account of changing-state and deviation effects by examining the veracity of the aggregate-based conceptualization of the neural model on which it hinges. At the same time, the experiment provides a test of the alternative, algorithm-based conceptualization of attentional capture.
In this experiment, we examine whether a repetition of voice within the context of an alternating-voice sequence of irrelevant speech tokens also disrupts serial recall. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, although it has been shown that a deviant repetition within a to-be-ignored auditory sequence evokes the MMN (Nordby et al., 1988) , whether this neural response to such deviations is accompanied by any behavioral consequences has yet to be determined. The repetition of a voice following an alternating voice pattern should only capture attention according to the algorithmic view and not according to the aggregate view, which is based on the absence of a match between the critical stimulus and its predecessor or predecessors. A deviant repetition effect would therefore undermine the validity of the aggregate-based view of attentional capture and hence, in turn, the attentional capture account of the changing-state effect. We therefore contrasted the effect on serial recall of a repeated letter spoken in an alternating female-male voice pattern containing one repetition of voice (e.g., A a A a A A a A a A; uppercase and lowercase letters represent, respectively, female-and male-spoken tokens) with that of a repeated letter in which there was no deviant repetition (e.g., A a  A a A a A a A a) .
Method Participants
Twenty-eight undergraduate students at Cardiff University took part in a repeated-measures design in return for course credits. All participants reported normal hearing and normal or corrected-tonormal vision.
Apparatus and Materials
The apparatus and materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1 except that just two types of irrelevant auditory sequence were created:
1. Alternating. In a sequence of this type, one letter was chosen randomly from the set A B C G J K L M Q S for each trial, was presented 10 times, and conveyed in an alternating femalemale voice fashion (e.g. , A a A a A a A a A a) .
2. Alternating ϩ voice repetition. This type of sequence was identical to the alternating sequence type except that a deviation from the alternating pattern occurred at the sixth irrelevant item because of a repetition of the female voice (i.e., A a A a A A a A a A).
Design
A fully repeated-measures design was used with two factors: deviation (2 levels: no deviant [i.e., alternating] and with deviant [i.e., alternating ϩ repetition]) and serial position (eight levels). There were 90 experimental trials consisting of 78 alternating trials and 12 alternating ϩ repetition trials. The 12 deviant trials were trials 8, 12, 20, 24, 31, 44, 51, 54, 64, 73, 81 , and 87.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1. Figure 3 shows the percentage of items correctly recalled in each serial position in the alternating and alternating ϩ repetition conditions. It is clear that performance was markedly poorer when a repetition of voice occurred in the irrelevant sequence. A repeated-measures ANOVA showed a main effect of deviation, F(1, 27) ϭ 4.50, MSE ϭ 232.73, p Ͻ .05, Cohen's d ϭ 0.82; and a main effect of serial position, F(7, 189) ϭ 28.98, MSE ϭ 243.31, p Ͻ .01, Cohen's d ϭ 2.07. There was also an interaction between deviation and serial position, F(7, 189) ϭ 3.27, MSE ϭ 40.81, p Ͻ .01, Cohen's d ϭ 0.70. This interaction may have stemmed from the fact that the deviation effect is not apparent either at the first or the last two serial positions (again, we do not seek to ascribe any theoretical significance to this interaction).
Results and Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 indicate that attentional capture is not related to the absence of a match between a stimulus and its predecessor(s) as required by an aggregate-based conceptualization of the neural model. Indeed, it seems that the repetition of voice captured attention precisely because it did match its immediate predecessor; that is, it captured attention because it violated the rule that two voices are alternating or that each item is in a different voice from the previous one. Given that the attentional capture account of the changing-state effect is predicated on an aggregate conceptualization of the neural model, this result provides the third line of evidence presented within the current series of experiments that goes against the unitary account of auditory distraction and that favors instead the duplex-mechanism account.
General Discussion
To summarize the implications of the present series: Experiment 1 established that a task-irrelevant voice deviation-a single change in the voice conveying a sequence of irrelevant speech tokens-disrupts performance of a visually presented serial recall task. Importantly, this voice-deviation effect was of a comparable magnitude when the deviant was embedded in a steady-or changing-state sequence, suggesting a functional independence between changing-state and deviation effects. Experiment 2 served to further dissociate the two types of phenomena in the context of a missing-item task: We showed for the first time that a deviant auditory event (a voice change) disrupts the ability to identify the item missing from a well-known, closed set of items, and at the same time replicated the finding that the changing-state effect does not occur in this setting (cf. Jones & Macken, 1993) . This result provides compelling evidence that one form of auditory distraction (the changing-state effect), but not another (deviation effect), is a joint product of the nature of the sound and the nature of the processing (specifically serial order retention) involved in the focal task. Finally, in Experiment 3 we tested the aggregate-based conceptualization of the neural model on which an attentional capture of the changing-state effect is logically based. It was found that the repetition of voice within the context of an alternating-voice sequence also disrupts serial recall. Such a deviation effect can only be explained by recourse to an alternative, algorithmic view of the neural model according to which the changing-state effect cannot be ascribed to attentional capture.
Implications of the Dissociation Between Deviation and Changing-State Effects
The results of all three experiments reported here converge strongly on the conclusion that deviation and changing-state effects are functionally distinct and therefore favor the duplexmechanism account over the unitary account of auditory distraction. It is also worth noting here that the functional dissociation between the changing-state and deviation effect indicates not only that the changing-state effect is not a (multiple) deviation effect but also that deviation effects are not changing-state effects. That is, it might otherwise have been argued that attentional capture plays no role at all in the auditory distraction effects found in the present setting and that a deviation effect is simply an additional changing-state effect in which a single deviant generates a strong cue to order that conflicts with the processing of order in the focal task (i.e., interference-by-process; Jones & Tremblay, 2000) .
It is worth highlighting that the functional dissociation between deviation and changing-state effects speaks not only to the nature of the changing-state effect but also to the most appropriate way of characterizing the functional preconditions for auditory attentional capture. The hypothesis that the changing-state effect and deviation effects are the same phenomenon (Cowan, 1995; Elliott, 2002) is coherent only if it is assumed that the prerequisite for attentional capture is simply the absence of a match between a stimulus and either the previous stimulus or an amalgamated representation of several previous stimuli. The present results, particularly the deviant repetition effect in Experiment 3, indicate that this view is untenable (see also Näätänen, 1990; Velden, 1978) . Rather, the key precondition for auditory attentional capture seems to be a stimulus that violates predictions based on an algorithmic neural model embodying a stimulus structure unfolding in time. According to this view, neither steady-nor changing-state stimuli would capture attention. Despite this, changing-state stimuli disrupt serial recall and must do so, therefore, by some mechanism other than attentional capture. That mechanism, we propose, is interferenceby-process (e.g., Jones & Tremblay, 2000) . We turn now to offer a conceptual framework as a guide for future research in which interference-by-process from changing-state stimuli and attentional capture by deviant events-although distinct phenomenamay be reconciled and integrated conceptually as different consequences of the same preattentive auditory perceptual organization process (Bregman, 1990) .
A Tentative Integrated Account of Changing-State and Deviation Effects
A unitary account of auditory distraction would have been attractive on the grounds of parsimony alone. However, we suggest that our duplex account is not as unparsimonious as it first appears, insofar as both effects may be understood within a single conceptual framework at a broader level of granularity. We speculate that both the changing-state effect and deviation effect may be related, in different ways, to the same preattentive changedetection process involved in the perceptual organization of the auditory scene into coherent temporally extended objects or streams (Bregman, 1990) .
A major task for the auditory system is to determine whether or not sequential auditory stimuli are emanating from the same en- vironmental source, a task accomplished by exploiting a host of factors embodied by Gestalt grouping principles such as similarity and good continuation (for an overview, see Bregman, 1993) . There is already ample evidence that the changing-state effect is intimately related to this sequential streaming process. For instance, the degree of disruption of serial recall by changing-state stimuli increases as a function of the degree of acoustic difference between successive stimuli within the sound, but, critically, only up to a point: When the difference becomes very large, the magnitude of disruption diminishes again (Jones, Alford, Bridges, Tremblay, & Macken, 1999; Jones & Macken, 1995; Macken et al., 2003) . It has been argued that the point of inflection in this function relating the degree of changing-state to the level of disruption corresponds to the point of perceptual fission, that is, the point at which the acoustic differences between successive stimuli are so large that the perceptual system partitions them into separate streams (for a discussion, see Jones et al., 1999) . Coupled with the observation that preattentive cues to order are highly impoverished for stimuli that traverse separate streams (Bregman & Campbell, 1971) , this nonmonotonic pattern is consistent with the view that the changing-state effect results from the preattentive processing of order in the sound conflicting with the order cues involved in serially rehearsing to-be-remembered material (Jones & Tremblay, 2000 ; for a characterization of the interference couched in terms of a broader, selection-for-action framework, see . In sum, the evidence indicates that the changing-state effect arises because of the processing of order derived from the preattentive detection of changes superimposed on a common ground. That is, such changes represent fluctuations of energy arising from the same environmental source or event (e.g., a sequence of different tokens spoken in the same voice being the example par excellence).
In contrast, we suggest that an auditory stimulus tends to capture attention when a stimulus violates the current set of heuristics (or algorithm) deployed by the perceptual system to integrate, preattentively, a succession of recent stimuli into the same coherent stream (see also Mondor, Zatorre, & Terrio, 1998; Rogers & Bregman, 1998) . From this standpoint, stream formation and neural model formation are synonymous. This hypothesis already receives some support from psychophysiological work. For example, Sussman, Ritter, and Vaughan (1998) presented a looping sequence of three different low tones and three different high tones in an alternating fashion (L1, H1, L2, H2, L3, H3, L1. . .), which was perceived (at a relatively high but not relatively low presentation rate) as two ascending streams (L1, L2, L3 and H1, H2, H3). It was found that the infrequent occurrence of a deviant subsequence (e.g., the low-tone sequence descending instead of ascending; L3, H1, L2, H2, L1, H3) produced an MMN response only if the low and high tones had been assigned perceptually into separate ascending low and high streams (i.e., at the high presentation rate). Such a finding is clearly consistent with the idea that deviance and its detection are intrinsically related to the organization of stimuli into streams. However, one aspect of Sussman et al.'s results that does not fit so well with the idea that attentional capture reflects the violation of the rules governing preattentive stream formation is that the deviant subsequence did not elicit an MMN unless the auditory stimuli were attended. However, other MMN-based studies have demonstrated an intimate link between deviance detection and stream formation in settings in which the auditory stimuli were to be ignored (Mü ller, Widmann, & Schröger, 2005) . A pertinent question that merits investigation, therefore, is whether this link between the MMN and streaming is reflected in behavioral distraction indices of attentional capture such as those used in the present study.
Concluding Remarks
The cognitive-behavioral paradigm developed here and in has proved fruitful as a means of dissociating changing-state and deviation effects. It may now be useful, however, to exploit the paradigm to focus specifically on the nature of the deviation effect. In particular, although a great deal of work, including most of the psychophysiological research, has been concerned with the antecedents of attentional capture by auditory deviants, far less is known about the consequences of attentional capture for cognitive processing. We suggest that the current paradigm (see also Escera et al., 1998; Lange, 2005) may be particularly well suited for examining the question of how, as well as when and why, focal task performance is disrupted by auditory attentional capture. The paradigm has already yielded some useful data in this regard, insofar as there is some evidence that the encoding of goal-relevant information may be particularly vulnerable to the effects of attentional capture: A temporal deviant disrupts serial recall if the deviant coincides with the presentation of the to-be-remembered stimuli but not if it occurs within a sound sequence confined to a retention interval that follows the final to-be-remembered item , Experiment 2). Indeed, this action of a temporal deviant again contrasts with that of the changing-state effect, which is produced regardless of the locus of the sound (i.e., presentation vs. retention interval), suggesting that the changing-state effect operates at a later stage of sequential action planning (e.g., Jones, Macken, & Nicholls, 2004; Macken, Mosdell, & Jones, 1999) . Thus, in tandem with the results of the present Experiment 2, a double dissociation has been demonstrated between changing-state and deviation effects. We anticipate that the present short-term memory paradigm will provide an important tool for studying the different cognitive sequelae of both forms of auditory distraction.
In conclusion, the present results support the view that there are at least two distinct forms of auditory distraction. One form of distraction occurs when the preattentive processing of sound yields information that happens to be a plausible candidate for the skill being deployed to perform the focal task. In the serial recall setting, this is manifested in the changing-state effect: Order cues derived from organizing sound sequences that exhibit some degree of change into a coherent stream compete or conflict with the order cues involved in retaining the to-be-remembered sequence (for an extension of this general principle to settings other than serial recall, see Marsh et al., in press; Marsh, Vachon, & Jones, 2007) . The second form of distraction (attentional capture) reflects a more general interruption mechanism designed to alert the organism to novel, and hence potentially important, events. The present results are consistent with the view that this capture mechanism is triggered when a stimulus violates an algorithm rather than when it is simply physically discrepant from recent stimuli. Whether this attentional capture process is, like the changing-state effect, intimately related to auditory perceptual organization awaits further behavioral evidence to complement that generated from psycho-physiological studies (Müller et al., 2005; Sussman et al., 1998) . If this relation can be confirmed, it would suggest that auditory perceptual organization plays two critical roles in striking the optimal balance between the selectivity and permeability of the cognitive system: It organizes the auditory scene into a set of coherent candidate objects for goal-directed (i.e., voluntary or endogenous) selection for action (cf. Houghton & Tipper, 1996) and at the same time provides the backdrop (the neural model) for assessing when an auditory stimulus should be endowed with the propensity to involuntarily (or exogenously) capture attention from the prevailing mental goal.
